A Note on Skinner and Pavlov’s Physiology. by García-hoz, Victor
These short notes describe the way in which Skinner considers and resolves his differences
with Pavlov in the question of the relation between psychology and physiology as forms
of knowledge. After establishing his viewpoint in the general epistemological issue,
Skinner is concerned about linking his study of behavior to the work of Pavlov, who
considered it to be of a physiological nature. Skinner contrasts Pavlov’s empirical and
theoretical work and characterizes the latter in terms of the notion of the “Conceptual
Nervous System.” 
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Se analizan en estas breves notas el modo en que Skinner plantea y resuelve sus
diferencias con Pavlov respecto a la relación entre psicología y fisiología como formas
de saber. Tras establecer su punto de vista en la cuestión epistemológica general, Skinner
se preocupa de vincular su estudio de la conducta con la obra de Pavlov, que éste
considera fisiológica por naturaleza. Skinner contrapone el trabajo empírico y el trabajo
teórico de Pavlov y caracteriza el último en términos de la noción de “Sistema Nervioso
Conceptual”.
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It goes without saying that there are many ways in which
Skinner can be associated with Pavlov. One could say that
they comprise a related pair in many psychology texts and
also, to use a terminology that would be novel to them, that
the name of one of them “primes” that of the other in the
short-term memory. Speaking less rhetorically, one gets a
strong feeling of unity between the works of Pavlov and
Skinner, and the progress of the one over the other is
continuous rather than discontinuous. 
However, a main and evident discrepancy can be noted
between these authors in the relation between psychology
and physiology as fields of knowledge. Pavlov and Skinner
have different and characteristic viewpoints about this
epistemological issue (that, ultimately, has to do with the
foundations of psychology), which—one would suppose—
would cause their works go in essentially divergent
directions, but which, however, does not occur. The
purpose of these notes is to analyze the way that Skinner
copes with and resolves—if he actually does so—this
doctrinal difference with Pavlov about the epistemological
foundation of psychology or, in other words, the value
and scope he assigns to the difference. In the end, the
object is to bring up one more episode, perhaps a trivial
one, in the extensive and confused history of the
epistemology of psychology. 
Physiology and Psychology in Pavlov and Skinner
As though he wished to first limit the terrain in which
he would move about, Pavlov proposes the relation between
physiology and psychology in the first pages of Conditioned
Reflexes (Pavlov, 1927). His treatment of the issue is
summary—which Pavlov himself regrets—but in any case,
he leaves no doubt about his point of view. Skinner is
concerned with the relation between psychology (or the
study of behavior) and physiology, in more detail and more
elaborately than Pavlov. In his classic work, The Behavior
of Organisms (Skinner, 1938), and when collecting prior
notions (Skinner, 1931/1961), Skinner establishes a viewpoint
that he will subsequently not change, although he often
refers to this issue. 
Pavlov
Pavlov begins by wondering whether, in order to explain
the activity of the brain’s hemispheres, “he [the physiologist]
should first of all study the methods of this science of
psychology, and only afterwards hope to study the
physiological mechanisms of the hemispheres” (Pavlov,
1927, p. 3). The answer is negative. And it is negative
because, for Pavlov, psychology might not be a scientific
activity, and is certainly not a natural or exact science. 
[I]t is still open to discussion whether psychology is a
natural science, or whether it can be regarded as a science at
all. [...] Even the advocates of psychology [James, Wundt] do
not look upon their science as being in any sense exact (p. 3).
Therefore, if physiology were built on psychology, then “we
shall be building our superstructure on a science which has no
claim to exactness even compared with physiology” (p. 3).
For Pavlov (1927), psychology refers to “some kind of
special psychical activity, whose working we feel and
apprehend in ourselves, and by analogy suppose to exist in
animals” (p. 3). The concepts and methods of psychology
are of a subjective and anthropomorphic nature that deprives
psychology of any value as a form of scientific-natural
knowledge. And this is because scientific-natural knowledge,
of which physiology is a part, is characterized by the use of
objective methods and is beyond the scope of subjective
methods. (With regard to these, Pavlov states that “As a
result of this investigation [early research with the so-called
psychic secretion], an unqualified conviction of the futility
of subjective methods of inquiry was firmly stamped upon
my mind” [p. 6]). In short, due to the nature of its methods
and concepts, psychology is an intellectual enterprise foreign
to natural science and, therefore, to physiology. It is important
to note that Pavlov’s considerations about psychology refer
to psychology in its developmental status at that time, and
the declaration of independence of physiology is also based
on that developmental status. But ultimately, psychology
could become a “true science” if, for that purpose, it sought
support in the “experimental investigation of the physiological
activities of the hemispheres.”
One could say then, that, for Pavlov, psychology does
not exist as a natural science but that, once it acquires that
nature, which it could thanks to physiology, it would still
not be a foundation of physiology, but would depend on
physiology and find its ultimate explanation in physiology.
In this sense, Pavlov attributes to his work the significance
and the merit of having rescued the study of the conditioned
reflexes from the mud of psychology, bringing it to the firm
ground of natural science. Pavlov thinks that thanks to his
work: 
[T]heir activities [of the cerebral hemispheres] are studied
as purely physiological facts, without any need to resort to
fantastic speculations as to the existence of any possible
subjective states in the animal which may be conjectured in
analogy with ourselves (Pavlov, 1927, p. 16).
Now—Pavlov believes—it is possible to say that
“‘education,’ ‘habits,’ and ‘training’ and all of these are
really nothing more than the results of an establishment of
new nervous connections during the post-natal existence of
the organism” (p. 26).
Skinner
Skinner (1938) wonders whether “the all but universal
belief that a science of behavior must be neurological in
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nature” (p. 418) is true. He expresses his disagreement with
this opinion and, in contrast, supports the conceptual and
empirical singularity of the study of behavior and its
independence of physiology. In his own words: “I am
asserting, then, not only that a science of behavior is
independent of neurology but that it must be established as
a separate discipline whether or not a rapprochement with
neurology is ever attempted” (Skinner, 1938, p. 423).
In order to refute them, Skinner identifies various
arguments in favor of neurologization. The argument to which
he concedes special importance and that he wishes to refute
above all the others is the one that, based on the idea that
neuronal activity is more fundamental than behavior, lends
reductive priority to physiological events and asserts that
behavior cannot be explained as long as we do not know the
correlative neurological phenomena. On the contrary, for
Skinner, the laws of behavior—laws that allow the prediction
and control of behavior—can be established without any
mention or knowledge of the organism’s physiology, and
they cannot be explained, or, evidently, invalidated in terms
of physiology (see Verplanck, 1954, p. 303). 
Skinner asserts that:
The discovery of neurological facts may proceed
independently of a science of behavior if the facts are directly
observed as structural and functional changes in tissues, but
before such a fact may be shown to account for a fact of
behavior, both must be quantitatively described and shown to
correspond in all their properties (Skinner, 1938, p. 422).
and that:
The very notion of a “neurological correlate” implies what
I am here contending—that there are two independent subject
matters (behavior and the nervous system) which must have
their own techniques and methods and yield their own
respective data. No amount of information about the second
will “explain” the first or bring order into it without the direct
analytical treatment represented by a science of behavior
(Skinner, 1938, p. 423).
And with echoes of Wittgenstein: “No merely
endocrinological information will establish the thesis that
personality is a matter of glandular secretion or that thought
is chemical” (Skinner, 1938, p. 423). Finally, as the previous
statements anticipate, even admitting the independence
between psychology and physiology, if one wished to
establish a relation between them, one would have to take
into account that “they [the laws of behavior] actually impose
certain limiting conditions upon any science which
undertakes to study the internal economy of the organism”
(Skinner, 1938, p. 432). 
Later on, Skinner (1950) will give another shape to his
arguments and will express his doubts about the function
of theories, denying their usefulness for the study of
behavior. A theory is “any explanation of an observed fact
which appeals to events taking place somewhere else, at
some other level of observation, described in different terms,
and measured, if at all, in different dimensions” (p. 39).
Among these useless theories that rather confuse research
are the physiological theories. Skinner points out that,
although in neurophysiology the references to physical
operations of the nervous system are not theories in this
sense, in a science of behavior, on the contrary,
all statements about the nervous system are theories in the
sense that they are not expressed in the same terms and could
not be confirmed with the same methods of observation as the
facts for which they are said to account (Skinner, 1950, pp. 69-70). 
Independence and Contradiction
Up till now, one can observe, on the one hand, a formal
community between Pavlov’s and Skinner’s arguments which
should be noted. Both of these authors, after identifying two
fields of study or knowledge, maintain the methodological
and conceptual independence of these fields and the need
to develop them separately. In practice, any researcher who
devotes himself to one discipline can forgo the other with
no qualms or misgivings. 
On the other hand there is, of course, a fundamental
difference that emerges from the claim of independence
made in each case for different, and even contradictory,
reasons. For Pavlov, physiology and psychology are
independent because psychology lacks meaning as a natural
science. And, in any case, in order to have meaning, it should
lean on physiology, to which it can, ultimately, be reduced.
Skinner, in contrast, considers that psychology, as the study
of behavior, is a natural science, as his own work
demonstrates, and therefore it is independent of and cannot
be reduced to physiology. It should be noted that Skinner
does not refer to this difference of opinion explicitly and
does not turn it into a matter of confrontation with Pavlov.
At this level of theoretical foundation, there is an evident
contradiction between Skinner and Pavlov that the former
avoids considering, perhaps so as not to emphasize his
differences with Pavlov. The contradiction, if it really exists,
is still not resolved. 
Conversely, one could also deny the contradiction. Thus,
it is true that the things that Pavlov and Skinner compare
to physiology are different terms and entities. It must be
taken into account that, as noted, Pavlov uses the term
“psychology” to denote the introspective psychology of the
late 19th century. On the other hand, Skinner does not relate
that kind of psychology to physiology, but instead “the study
of behavior” that becomes firmly fixed in the first third of
the 20th century, and which Pavlov essentially did not know
when he published Conditioned Reflexes. And Skinner would
doubtless literally subscribe to many of Pavlov’s statements
about the introspective psychology of the 19th century. (The
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latter had written that the work of the small group of
American “behaviourists” could be considered “as purely
physiological in character” [Pavlov, 1927, p. 7]). From this
viewpoint, it could be concluded that there is no opposition
between Skinner and Pavlov, because what they are
comparing and relating to physiology are different fields of
study or sets of phenomena. 
However, in any case, Skinner forgets about Pavlov
regarding the basic epistemological issue of the relation
between psychology and physiology and lays aside their
differences about this without lingering over them.
Concerning Pavlov, Skinner tries to answer a different
question related to the general issue but, so to say, more
concrete, and referring in particular to Pavlov’s work. In its
essential terms, the question is: If Pavlov was devoted to
the study of the “higher nervous activity,” by which can be
understood the physiological processes that occur in the
cerebral cortex, that is, given that Pavlov was a physiologist,
how can his work fit in a study of behavior that is declared
to be conceptually and methodologically independent of
physiology? What value can Pavlov’s methods and findings,
manifestly those of a physiologist, have for psychology as
the study of behavior? Skinner’s answer is preceded by a
series of considerations and concepts that are outlined below. 
Ways of Physiologizing
Skinner distinguishes two practical manifestations of the
argument in favor of neurologization or, in other words, two
modes or levels of explanation of behavior in physiological
terms. 
The Conceptual Nervous System
According to Skinner, there is a first level where the
physiological explanation consists of a series of local
references, neurological in that sense, among which are
noteworthy the synapse and its various states, such as
conductivity, excitability, or resistance. However, these
references are not derived from direct observation of the
nervous system as a real structure that undergoes physical-
chemical changes, but from a comparison of the input
with the output that is very similar to that employed in
the case of behavior. At this level of physiologizing, a
framework of new references is introduced; the behavioral
data are formulated in different terms as laws of synapse.
But ultimately—Skinner (1938) insists—there are few
differences between this type of concepts and neurological
laws and the concepts and laws that are established in the
study of behavior. “The data upon which the system is
based are very close to those of a science of behavior,
and the difference in formulation may certainly be said
to be trivial with respect to the status of the observed
facts” (p. 421). 
As an example of this kind of explanation, Skinner takes
the well known and influential work of Sir Charles
Sherrington The Integrative Action of the Nervous System
published in 1906. In his work, Sherrington (as cited in
Skinner, 1938) points out that the reflex action of a spinal
dog manifests different properties from those observed in
preparations in which the spinal cord does not intervene and
conduction is restricted to a section of the motor nerve trunk,
as in the so-called nerve-muscle preparation. Sherrington
links these differences between conduction in the reflex arch
and conduction in the nerve trunk to the existence of a
synapse, or separation surface between the adjacent nervous
cells in the reflex arch, to which he attributes a certain
number of states and processes of various natures. Skinner
argues that the empirical data of the British physiologist are
almost exclusively concerned with the behavior of the animal
when faced with some kind of stimulation, so that the
properties of the synapse are inferred from the properties
of the relation between the stimulus and the response, and
this information is what constitutes the basis of his teachings
about the nervous system. Thus, the statement that repeated
afferent firing produces an increase in synaptic resistance
or a decrease in excitability—according to Skinner—reflects
the behavioral fact that the repetition of an afferent firing
in a certain temporal sequence provokes progressively
weaker efferent firings. One could say that the language
gets changed but not the facts to which it refers. 
To describe this level of physiologizing, Skinner
introduces the notion of the conceptual nervous system. In
“The Concept of the Reflex in the Description of Behavior”
he asserts that the synapse, as analyzed and described by
Sherrington, “[…] is the conceptual expression for the
conditions of correlation of a stimulus and response, where
the incidental conditions imposed by a particular stimulus
and a particular response have been eliminated” (Skinner,
1931/1961, p. 335, no emphasis added). In The Behavior of
Organisms Skinner generalizes this—one could say—notion
of conceptual synapse to suggest that physiology of the reflex
at this level of elaboration, rather than being concerned with
what is traditionally known as the C.N.S. (Central Nervous
System), is instead concerned with what could be called the
“Conceptual Nervous System” (Skinner, 1938, p. 421). 
Skinner argues that, as there is no—nor is any
intended—direct observation of the nervous system as a
physical entity, what is implied and described at this level
of neurologization is not the central nervous system but a
conceptual nervous system. By a conceptual nervous system
(CONS) Skinner means a purely abstract and conceptual
system—a being of reason, as a Scholastic would say—,
with which one tries to explain or justify behavior by means
of a series of elements and action schemes that, to some
extent, mimic or are inspired by the action of the nervous
system. In other words, in a CONS, the neurological
correlate of a behavioral fact is purely “inferential” and
abstract, deprived of any physiological reality. In “Are
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Theories of Learning Necessary?” (Skinner, 1950/1961),
he will come back to the CONS, showing it as a notion
that is applicable to a way of theorizing –or perhaps
“modelization”—that is increasingly popular: 
The writer’s suggestion that the letters CNS be regarded
as representing, not the Central Nervous System, but the
Conceptual Nervous System seems to have been taken seriously.
Many theorists point out that they are not talking about the
nervous system as an actual structure undergoing physiological
or biochemical changes but only as a system with a certain
dynamic output (p. 40).
“Real” Physiology
Skinner distinguishes and separates from the former level
a second level of physiologizing which, he says, is the truly
physiological level, where the object of research and analysis
is the nervous system itself. 
At this level, according to Skinner (1938), the
neurological correlate is sought in terms of a more complete
local reference that is based on direct observation of the
synaptic or nervous processes in question. In other words,
in this case, the neurological correlate has its own reality
and the data refer to a certain type of structural and
functional changes in the tissues expressed as physical-
chemical terms and concepts. Thus, whereas at the former
level, the strength of the reflex becomes synaptic
conductivity, now “the notion of synaptic conductivity is
to be translated in terms, say, of permeability or ionic
concentration” (p. 422). At the “physical-chemical” level—
that Skinner also calls the level of “real” physiology—the
data are not behavioral data expressed in other terms, but
data about another kind of facts and for which is needed
a different dimensional system from the one corresponding
to the data—also called physiological but ultimately
behavioral data—that are considered at the previous level. 
It should be noted that this level of, so to say, hard and
fast physical-chemical neurologization is usually taken as
ultima ratio of the study of behavior and the level at which
are aimed the arguments of The Behavior of Organisms in
favor of the need to study and explain behavior
independently and in its own terms. Regarding the first
conceptual and abstract level, Skinner makes another kind
of consideration. Each of the levels of neurologization
implies a different explanation mode and, therefore, deserves
a different rebuttal. 
Pavlov and the Conceptual Nervous System
For Skinner, Pavlov’s physiology is a way of conceptual
neurologization, at the first level, so the value and meaning
of Pavlov’s work is discussed from the viewpoint of the
conceptual nervous system. 
Pavlov’s Level of Physiologizing
Skinner considers that the physiology that Pavlov says
he studies is, perhaps to a greater extent than that of
Sherrington, a purely abstract conceptualization and which,
independently of the nature of the terms he uses, is entirely
derived from the conditions of the relation between the
environmental events and the organism’s movements.
Pavlov’s data are behavioral data, obtained from pure
observation of the activity of the animal in interaction with
its environment, without considering local, physiological,
or biochemical changes undergone by the nervous system.
And the data are still behavioral data, despite the fact that
Pavlov, resorting to a certain language, formulates them as
physiological concepts and laws. 
About Pavlov’s main work, Skinner states:
The subtitle of his Conditioned Reflexes is ‘An investigation
of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex,’ but no
direct observations of the cortex are reported. The data given
are quite obviously concerned with the behavior of reasonably
intact dogs, and the only nervous system of which he speaks
is the conceptual one (Skinner, 1938, p. 427). 
According to Skinner, Pavlov does not practice “real” or
“physical-chemical” physiology, but rather, regarding his work,
one can only talk about physiology in a conceptual sense. One
could say that, for Skinner, the Pavlovian notion of nervous
connection between the center or “analyzer” of the CS and
the US, for example, is nothing more than an abstract concept
based on physiology but without any physical reality or
capacity to explain behavior beyond expressing certain
behavioral realities. Skinner’s more or less explicit conclusion
is that “higher nervous activity” is just Pavlov’s name for
behavior or for behavior described in terms of a CONS.
Therefore, Skinner’s issue with Pavlov, so to say, is not
Skinner’s issue of with “real” or “physical-chemical”
physiology, which Pavlov supposedly did not practice;
instead it is the issue of Skinner’s critique of the CONS,
which, according to Skinner, Pavlov is dedicated to build.
The Critique of the Conceptual Nervous System and
the Valuation of Pavlov’s Work
As Pavlov was devoted to the CONS, Skinner’s judgment
of the value of this kind of systems should determine his
appraisal of Pavlov’s work and of its pertinence for the study
of behavior. However, as will be seen below, this is not
exactly what happens: The valuation of Pavlov’s work seems
to affect the estimate about the CONS, which is modified
when referring it to Pavlov. 
The critique of the Conceptual Nervous System. On the
one hand, Skinner (1938) finds some not minor objections—
or perhaps no advantages—to the use of the CONS as an
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explanatory tool or means of knowledge. Chiefly, the CONS
facilitates or conceals the commission of essential errors,
such as attributing behavior to a nervous fact and seeking
the explanation of the laws of behavior in physiology. By
its own nature, which mixes observations and its interpretation
in certain terms, the CONS is equivocal and causes confusion
about the place it occupies and the explanations it provides:
“the use of terms with neural references when the
observations upon which they are based is misleading”
(Skinner, 1938, pp. 426-427). 
From the viewpoint of the ultimate explanatory value
of the CONS, Skinner reviews some of its characteristic
constituent elements—such as “the connective network which
is offered to account for the topographical relations of stimuli
and responses” (Skinner, 1938, p. 421) — to point out that
“the essential advance from a description of behavior at is
own level is, I submit, very slight” (p. 421). The CONS
does not introduce more order or clarity in the data nor,
contrary to some people’s assumptions, does it contribute
to affirming the regularity of the relations between the
stimulus and the response. In a more subjective vein, Skinner
finally points out: “An explanation of behavior in conceptual
terms of this sort would not be highly gratifying” (Skinner,
1938, pp. 421-422, no emphasis added).
Pavlov and the use of the Conceptual Nervous System.
The tone of the critique becomes weaker when relating the
CONS to Pavlov. Then, resorting to the CONS constitutes
“a legitimate procedure” (Skinner, 1938, p. 427). But, of
course, a legitimate procedure insofar as its usage rules are
respected. That is, insofar as the behavioral data are not
substituted by another kind of data; and insofar as “the laws
established are not turned to ‘explain’ the very observations
upon which they are based” (p. 427). Apparently, Pavlov
takes these restrictions into account, and Skinner finds
nothing with which to reproach him regarding the CONS. 
In effect, faced with the errors that the CONS can
facilitate, Skinner insists that Pavlov’s data are behavioral
data, whose primacy is respected without being substituted
by any other kind of data, independently of the language in
which they are conceptualized. Regarding the chief error
that the CONS promotes, Skinner does not wonder whether
Pavlov shares the opinion of those who erroneously think
that physiology is, say, the ultimate explanation of behavior.
It is noteworthy that, as an example of the incorrect use or
abuse of the CONS as an explanation of behavior, Skinner
(1938) quotes Holt and, surprisingly, Holt’s employment of
Pavlov’s concepts, without exactly linking Pavlov to the
error (p. 427).
Summing up, the CONS, as probably is the case with
other ways of theorizing, can be used appropriately, but it
can also be improperly used and constitute a source or errors
and mixtifications. One might even say that the CONS is
particularly prone to deviated usage. But, in any case, Pavlov
is a privileged and irreproachable user. Whatever the errors
induced by the CONS, Skinner is not willing to accuse
Pavlov of these errors, although it is unlikely that Pavlov
did not commit them. As mentioned above, Skinner’s
consideration of the CONS seems to be one kind when it
is about the CONS itself and a different one when it is
associated with Pavlov. In the first case, Skinner primarily
mentions the mistakes and errors to which the CONS lends
itself and the few advantages that it, in fact, offers; where
Pavlov is concerned, the problems of the CONS are usage
problems which Pavlov avoids.
To conclude, it is obvious that when characterizing
Pavlov’s work in terms of the CONS—insisting on its correct
use—Skinner deprives the Russian’s work of its
physiological character propie dicto and reclaims it as a
work whose true issue is behavior. Skinner’s considerations
about Pavlov’s work are guided by the idea that: (a) In
Pavlov’s work, there is an important series of methods,
findings, and procedures strictly referred to behavior; and
(b) the value of these findings should be deemed
independently of the physiological-conceptual theories that
Pavlov builds based on them. In Skinner’s analysis, Pavlov
is an investigator of behavior and only nominally or for
himself a physiologist. As a description—and praise—of
Pavlov’s work, Skinner (1953) writes: “Pavlov’s achievement
was the discovery, not of neural processes, but of important
quantitative relations which permits us, regardless of
neurological hypotheses, to give a direct account of behavior
in the field of the conditioned reflex” (p. 54).
Skinner’s Reasons 
One could state that, with regard to Pavlov, Skinner has
to reconcile two strategic aims that, at first glance, seem
mutually exclusive. On the one hand, as seen more than
once, Skinner feels the need to establish psychology or the
study of behavior independently of physiology. As Verplanck
(1954) has pointed out, Skinner’s “axiom” about the
independence of psychology from physiology “permits
Skinner to proceed with his experimental investigations and
system-building without reference to the physiology of the
organism or to the structure and function of the
neuro-skeletal system” (p. 303). And Timberlake (1988)
states that, for Skinner “to achieve his aim of a common
framework for the study of purposive and reflexive
behavior”, it was imperative to free the concepts of stimulus,
response, and reflex from their obvious physiological
connotations. “To fail in this was to disallow the jump from
reflex to purpose, because it was clear that purposive
behavior depended on more than the restricted set of
neurological pathways determining spinal reflexes” (p. 305).
Skinner’s other goal was to reaffirm the value of Pavlov’s
work, on which his own work is based. This is not the
appropriate place to analyze aspects of the relation between
Skinner and Pavlov that do not refer to the epistemological
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issue of psychology and physiology, but, in any case, the
close experimental and conceptual link of the former
researcher with the latter should be noted. Skinner’s
contribution to the study and conceptualization of behavior
consists, to a great extent, of having pursued with a new
and broader scope procedure—operant conditioning—the
research program developed by Pavlov with his own
procedure. In sum, Pavlov’s methods and findings provide
the immediate empirical foundation for Skinner’s work. The
former statement is made without a trace of the derogatory
tone used by some of Skinner’s critics or Pavlov’s enthusiasts
when mentioning this fact. If Pavlov invented an
experimental program, the best thing that Skinner could do
was to adopt it. 
Skinner’s solution, as seen, has two parts. On the one
hand, he ignores or conceals his differences with Pavlov
about the function of physiology in the study of psychology,
not mentioning him when addressing the issue. On the other
hand, Skinner makes an effort to leave safe and sound the
value of Pavlov’s work for the study of behavior. With this
aim, he distinguishes an empirical aspect and a theoretical
or conceptual aspect in the Russian’s work, to disconnect
the former from the latter and to reveal the empirical side
as part of the study of behavior, which, therefore, is within
the field of the researchers dedicated to behavior. Thus,
Skinner is in a position to vindicate a way of working that
is not at all physiological and that, however, is closely related
to Pavlov’s way of working. 
This interpretation of Pavlov as a student of behavior
seems correct and helps to understand the nature of his work.
In other important researchers of animal learning, closer to
Pavlov in the issue of the psychology-philosophy relationship,
one finds a confusing and equivocal interpretation of Pavlov.
Such is the case of C. L. Hull, who in his systematic work
Principles of Behavior (1943) reveals his propensity towards
Pavlov’s epistemological stance with the statement that
“nearly all serious students of behavior like to believe that
some day the major neurological laws will be known in a
form adequate to constitute the foundation principles of a
science of behavior” (p. 19). However, when mentioning
Pavlov, Hull refers to his experiments as experiments about
“the molar behavior of organisms, usually as integrated
wholes” (p. 20), in accordance with Skinner’s considerations.
Nevertheless, Hull also states that the object of these
experiments were “the coarse, or ‘molar,’ laws of neural
activity as revealed by conditioned-reflex and related
experiments” (p. 29). From which one can conclude that, for
Hull, Pavlov is a physiologist, although not of molecular
nervous activity, but of molar behavior or the organism as
a whole. And in order to effectively link Pavlov with
physiology, Hull compares Pavlov’s molar laws with “the
molar mechanics of the physical world [Galileo and Newton]”
that have preceded and made possible the “micro-mechanics
of the atomic and subatomic world”, that is, “the molecular
science of modern relativity and quantum theory [Einstein,
Planck]” that correspond with molecular neurology (see Hull,
1943, p. 20). For Hull, then, one could say that Pavlov’s
work is a way or stage of physiology that will finally lead
“to a truly molecular theory of behavior firmly based on
physiology” (p. 20).
One last consideration with regard to the idea of the
CONS. Following Skinner, one could define as conceptually
physiological—or call it a CONS—any abstract system made
up of a number of structurally interrelated centers, to which
one assigns sensory or motor activity and the capacity of
transmitting, by activation or inhibition, a kind of energy
theoretically linked to the nervous impulse. Perhaps this is
the first time a concept is elaborated—or an expression is
coined—to represent those models that employ abstract
functional elements and properties taken from physiology
as an illustration or justification of certain regularities
observed in the study of behavior. (At one time [Gray, 1979],
the concept of CONS was erroneously attributed to D. O.
Hebb, who simply used it in the title of a well-known article
[Hebb,1955]). It can be noted that a CONS is, of course, a
mechanical model, in the sense that it derives its explanatory
capacity from a notion of purely physical causality
(Dickinson, 1989); but it is also a special kind of mechanical
model with original properties. 
There is a broad range of models or theoretical
constructions that could be thus characterized. In the study
of animal learning, an example of CONS prior to Pavlov
is, for example, the physiological mechanism that C. L.
Morgan (1894) proposed to explain the physical connection
that underlies the association of ideas. And a recent example
of CONS is the one elaborated by the connectionist systems,
whose elements are defined or described as “neuron-like”
units or abstract neurons. If a connectionist system is
conceived as a level of implementation, its characterization
could be completed by saying that it is a physiological
implementation of an abstract nature, and that what it
simulates or refers to is not the central nervous system but
the conceptual nervous system. 
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